The identity of the Turkish state has been transformed under the rule of Islamist President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the central role that religion has come to play in its foreign policy is best exemplified in its relations with the Balkans.
The secular identity, not subscribing to exclusionary secularism but a much more sensitive approach to religious claims, would be more inclusive and pluralist.
Given the different and often conflicting agendas, a future Russia-China-Turkey bloc is unlikely but three countries continue to use each other as leverage in their economic and foreign affairs
In the absence of President Trump’s personal relationship with President Erdogan, US-Turkey relations under the Biden administration will return to institutional avenues previously damaged by the actions of the Erdogan government.
The MHP is not necessarily pulling the AKP towards any particular policy position. The AKP would have taken all these steps in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean even if the MHP weren’t in the picture.
Trump protected Erdogan from CAATSA sanctions in all the ways that a president can. Yet, it’s not because he likes Erdogan. Will Joe Biden do the same?
An arena for global power games for centuries, the Balkans has yet again become the site of geopolitical competition with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Declaring early elections would be the AKP’s last choice, because there is absolutely no need for them to have early elections
Many people in Washington viewed that there are three pillars of the U.S- Turkey relationship: first is the shared values of democracy, second is Turkey as a key NATO ally in countering Russia and the third pillar is about Turkey’s regional importance.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, we found that most AKP supporters were not meaningfully Islamist in their political views, and that nativism and jingoism could be seen as far more powerful forces than religious conservatism in many ways.